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Sex-selective abortion
Gender, culture and Dutch public policy
SAWITRI SAHARSO
Free University, Amsterdam
INTRODUCTION
When, in 1973, race relations researcher Christopher Bagley visited the
Netherlands, he praised the Dutch for their tolerance and enthusiastically
reported that the British could learn something from them (Bagley, 1973).
Thirty years later, in July 2003, the British advisor on immigration and
integration, Trevor Phillips, paid a visit to the Netherlands. His judgement
was less positive. He was shocked by the intolerance in the Netherlands, in
particular by the negative policy concerning immigrants. He thereby
referred to the intended policy, amongst others, to prohibit the wearing of
hijab in some schools and to a policy intention to combat arranged
marriages.1 ‘It was, as if I was smacked in the face’, said Phillips. Accord-
ing to him the intended policies were inadmissible infringements upon
immigrants’ privacy.2 He suspected that the Dutch were suffering from a
post Pim Fortuyn (the recently assassinated far-right politician) trauma
(De Waard, 2003).3
Polls do indeed point to a hardening of the Dutch public opinion about
immigrants (Dagevos et al., 2003: 432, 433).4 There is also, from the part of
the government, less willingness to recognize the cultural claims of
minorities and a more compelling demand to adjust to Dutch culture (e.g.
own language teaching is no longer state facilitated and citizenship
education is made compulsory for immigrants). So, yes, Phillips is right that
Dutch tolerance is decreasing. Yet, does that make policy that interferes
with the cultural traditions of minority groups always a sign of intolerance
and an inadmissible infringement of their freedom? I do not think so.
It has been pointed out, most prominently by Susan Moller Okin (1999),
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that recognition of cultural diversity can be at odds with women’s rights, in
which case interference might be justified. Yet, the issue is more complex
than that. As a feminist at home with postcolonial theory, I find it imposs-
ible to ignore the long western tradition of representing other cultures as
inferior. In particular, there is the continued imagery of Islam as a religion
predisposed to maltreat the female sex. In the present Dutch climate of
increased intolerance of minority groups, a concern with gender inequality
could be merely a proxy for attacks on minority groups. It would be tragic,
though, if our commitment to multicultural respect would keep us from
recognizing gender injustice. The challenge is hence to be critical, yet not
to add to the further demonization of minority groups. In this article, I will
try to demonstrate that taking a critical stance against minority cultural
practices can go together with a sensitivity to the cultural identities and
interests of minority women.
I shall present a case that was hotly discussed in the Netherlands, i.e. the
case of sex-selective abortion (hereafter SSA). My main reason for focusing
on this particular case is that, in it, multiculturalism and feminism seem so
clearly to be at loggerheads. Yet, they are not, so I shall argue. This case
helps me hence to sustain my position that (a) it is important to be alert
that policies that accommodate minority cultures do not add to the
oppression of female group members, (b) yet, we should not pit a priori
multicultural and feminist concerns against each other, and (c) our judge-
ment of cultural practices should take into account the wider social context
in which they exist. In this latter claim, I am inspired by the so-called
contextual approach to tolerance, and my discussion of the case may also
be read as a plea for contextualism.
Second, I choose this case, because of its possible relevance for other
countries as well. As I shall discuss later, the pre-natal diagnostic techniques
that are required for sex determination of the foetus are also available in
other European countries and the abortion legislation in most European
countries is such that it makes SSA possible.
My third reason to work out this case is that it illustrates how predomi-
nant in public discourse the modernization thesis still is – contrasting
culture, tradition and oppression with modernity, rationality and liberaliz-
ation – and at the same time how inapt this thesis is for understanding
multicultural conflict. The effect of this cultural imagery is that minority
women get reduced to mere prisoners of their culture. Yet requests for SSA
are made by women. If one is not willing, as I am, to merely see them as
cultural dupes, how then are we to consider these requests? What is also at
issue, therefore, in the case I shall present, is the moral agency of the
women concerned.
DEBATE
CONTEXTUALIZED MORALIT Y
Before I discuss the case of SSA, let me briefly explain my theoretical
perspective.5
In the past decade we have seen, in particular in the field of multi-
culturalism, a proliferation of philosophical theories that try to connect
normative theory with empirical case studies. A common ambition of
authors as varied as Walzer (1983), Kymlicka (1995), Carens (2000), Parekh
(2000) or Benhabib (2002) is to put political philosophy to work in the
empirical context of contemporary plural societies and to develop theory
that is of relevance for contemporary social conflicts and policy dilemmas.
It might not be overstated to call this the contextual turn in political
philosophy.
Why should context count? The contextual turn is, amongst others,
inspired by the realization that liberal principles are general principles and,
as such, too indeterminate to lead to a judgement in specific cases (see
Carens, 2000; Parekh, 2000). Moreover, in particular cases, it often turns
out that liberal justice arguments provide both strong foundations for
accommodating cultural minorities and strong reasons for drawing limits to
tolerance. To put it differently, liberal principles often pull against each
other (see Williams, 2000). ‘We may all claim that we respect one another’,
so writes Seyla Benhabib, ‘but we cannot know what such respect requires
or entails in the face of deep cultural conflicts’ as very often ‘we do not share
a common understanding of the disputed practice itself’. Therefore, what
we need to reach is ‘not only understanding of the norms in question, but
a situational understanding of these norms’ intended applications’
(Benhabib, 2002: 12, emphasis in original). Hence, ‘to determine what
justice requires in a particular case’, writes Joseph Carens, ‘one must
immerse oneself in the details of the case and make contextually sensitive
judgements rather than rely primarily on the application of abstract general
principles’ (2000: 14). And hence, ‘history matters, numbers matter, the
relative importance of the claims of the claimants matter, and so do many
other considerations’ (2000: 12). From this follows, first, that while in the
classical deductive way of moral arguing only justice arguments are
allowed, in a contextual approach, non-moral arguments, like Carens’s
numbers or the actual power relations in which a practice takes place, are
also allowed and may co-determine our moral considerations. Second, if
context counts, it follows that what may be an acceptable arrangement in
one society, may not be so in other societies (see Carens, 2000: 7).
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SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION: LEGAL CONTEXT
In 1997, a debate took place in the Netherlands in which it was assumed, at
least by some of the participants, that certain cultural minorities have a
cultural preference for sons. Based on this preference, they may desire SSA.
SSA involves the identification of the foetus’s sex during the pregnancy
using pre-natal diagnosis, followed by abortion of the foetus if it proves to
be of the undesired sex.6 The overture to this discussion was a television
programme, the implication of which was that abortion is too easy in the
Netherlands. In the programme, two abortion practitioners stated that they
refrained from any moral judgement and accepted any motive underlying
a woman’s wish for an abortion. Moreover, these doctors stated that the
fact that the foetus was the ‘wrong’ sex was no reason to refuse a termin-
ation. The debate was further fuelled when the Minister of Health inter-
vened with a clear statement that she considered SSA permissible in the
Netherlands. The public debate then concentrated on the Minister’s
statement.
If SSA is to be applied, the sex of the foetus has first to be determined.
SSA is thus closely related to the rise of pre-natal diagnosis (PND) in
genetics, notably chorionic villus sampling, amniocentesis or ultrasound.7
In general, pre-natal diagnosis and selective abortion are driven by the
desire to prevent illness. As some illnesses are sex-linked, the debate in
medical ethics concerns what genetic diseases or congenital anomalies are
so serious that they justify PND and selective abortion. As the sex of a child
is not in itself considered an illness, sex can never be a justification for PND
and abortion in medical ethics. The policy of the professional groups
involved in PND in the Netherlands, and in European countries generally,
is therefore not to grant requests for sex-selective tests. It is still possible,
however, to discover the sex of the foetus. From 36 years onwards – 35 years
in most other European countries – age is a valid medical indication for
chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis. It is common practice among
genetic counsellors to inform the woman concerned of the foetus’s sex
when she is told about the presence or absence of a disorder or anomaly.
In regular healthcare, ultrasound is carried out on medical indication only.
The policy here is not to disclose the foetus’s sex, because determining sex
using ultrasound is less dependable than through the other two techniques.
However, women of any age can go to a private clinic which will perform
ultrasound scanning on request. No medical indication is required, and
these clinics are usually willing to disclose the sex of the foetus. It is, there-
fore, technically possible, and depending on the mother’s age or the
technique used, legally permissible to determine the sex of the foetus.8
According to Dutch law, abortion is only permitted if there is risk to the
mother’s life or health, or if the woman is in a critical situation which cannot
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be resolved in any other way. This ‘critical situation’ includes psychosocial
distress. As it proved impossible to formulate general criteria for the
definition of a critical situation, the legislature sought refuge in procedural
measures to guarantee cautious decision making in individual cases. The
woman is legally obliged to take five days’ time to reflect. The practitioner
is responsible for determining through interview whether the woman is
genuinely convinced that an abortion is the only way to resolve the problem
and to inform her about alternatives to abortion.9 Because the law does not
define what constitutes a critical situation, ultimately it is the woman who
decides, thus making SSA legally possible. In most European countries
women have, as in the Netherlands, a legal right to decide on the termin-
ation of pregnancy, or the abortion laws in these countries recognize rather
broad grounds for permitting abortion, including sociomedical reasons, like
the UK (except Northern Ireland) (Outshoorn, 1996). As the Netherlands
is, compared with other European countries, rather reluctant in offering
PND to pregnant women, it follows that SSA is legally possible in most
European countries (Hiu, 2003).
THE PUBLIC DEBATE
The question of whether Dutch law on abortion is too liberal thus boils
down to the question of whether the definition of a critical situation is too
liberal. The then Dutch Minister of Health, Els Borst, made the following
statement during a television program on 17 January 1997, which was
widely reported in the press:
I can imagine that a woman from a foreign culture finds herself in such a critical
situation when she has a daughter for the third or fourth time and her marriage,
or even her life, is at stake. (De Volkskrant, 1997a)
She adhered to this statement during questions in parliament. Ms Borst, as
a reputed feminist and liberal, repeated: ‘I can imagine a critical situation
like that, and it’s not easy for me to say this’ (De Volkskrant, 1997c).
Her statement provoked considerable reaction.10 Unsurprisingly, these
were predominantly negative. Many Christians reject the notion of abortion
altogether; some believe it should be allowed only if the life or health of
the mother is threatened. Many saw the issue as yet another example of
legislative deficiencies in protecting unborn life. The president of the Dutch
Society of Abortion Practitioners, Dr Beekhuizen, pointed out that moral
dilemmas about abortion are closely related to developments in pre-natal
diagnosis. Beekhuizen opined that when pre-natal testing is done, only
medically relevant information should be transmitted to the woman. This
information would not generally include the sex of the foetus. Due to his
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steadfast belief in sexual equality, he found SSA difficult to perform
(Trouw, 1997). Numerous other participants in the debate argued that the
Minister’s policy clearly overstepped a boundary. They advanced argu-
ments pointing to the fact that whilst some immigrants may prefer a son to
a daughter, this preference does not lead them to consider SSA as an option
and that, in practice, it does not appear to occur. It was further alleged that
in the absence of evidence, speculation functions to stigmatize immigrant
groups. The joint national organizations of and for black, migrant and
refugee women, and the Vrouwenberaad Ontwikkelingssamenwerking
(Women’s Council on Development Aid), sent an open letter to the
Minister (Vrouwenberaad Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, AISA, TARGUIA
and TIYE International, 1997). This letter pointed out that the Minister’s
statements betrayed a misplaced cultural relativism. They claimed that the
right of self-determination and the principle of non-discrimination on the
basis of sex are universal. Consequently, whenever a local culture or
tradition is in conflict with these principles, the principles should be
respected above tradition. The signatories to the open letter added that the
Minister’s statement showed a rigid notion of culture; it appeared to
indicate cultures cannot change, or that everyone thinks in the same way
about his or her culture, or that minority women do not oppose certain
misogynous traditions within their own cultures. The Minister’s statement,
according to the open letter, is thus ‘a smack in the face for many women
in the Netherlands who campaign for gender equality and equivalence in
their own community’. The women’s organizations that signed the open
letter wanted to retain intact the right to self-determination, but they also
considered that the principle of sexual equality should not be made relative.
It is unclear whether they failed to see the contradiction, as clearly one
cannot have both here, or thought that women do not voluntarily choose a
SSA, as a columnist in a national newspaper (NRC Handelsblad), Anil
Ramdas, assumed (Ramdas, 1997). He argued that it would seem in this
case as if individual freedom (the woman decides, for example, not to have
a daughter) clashes with the principle of equality between men and women.
But, he continued, it only seems that way. If a woman does not want a child
because she does not want to interrupt her career, or because she is unem-
ployed and will have to take care of the child entirely by herself, then these
are critical situations experienced as such by the individual. What we think
about these personal motives is irrelevant: ‘If the motive is serious enough
for her, who are we to contradict her?’ The situation is different, he argued,
in the case of a Muslim woman who does not want any more girls. In that
case ‘it is not a matter of an individual desire, but of a culturally imposed
demand: thou shalt bear males’, and, according to Ramdas, we should not
sympathize. This wish is the result of the ‘male chauvinism of Islam’ and
should therefore be rejected. What is more, by showing sympathy, ‘the
Minister abandons Islamic women and sticks a knife into the back of the
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incipient emancipation movement in that culture’ (Ramdas, 1997). So,
although he followed a somewhat different route, Ramdas came to the
same conclusion as the signatories of the open letter. The opponents of
Borst’s cultural relativism were also in agreement on the solutions. The
open letter from the women’s organizations called for policy that tackles
the underlying cause of the desire for abortion. This cause lies in ‘a situ-
ation of injustice and discrimination against women and girls’. Arnold
Koper, a columnist in another national newspaper, did not beat about the
bush and stated firmly that ‘if a culture is sexist, it should be opposed’
(Koper, 1997).
The Minister’s reaction to the debate was a commitment to investigate
whether abortion clinics had stretched the notion of a ‘critical situation’
beyond tolerance. That investigation has since been completed and there
appears to be no question of elasticism; the procedures are correctly
employed, and hence there is no reason to tighten the abortion law (De
Boer, 1997).
PRAGMATISM RECONSIDERED
The issue seemed settled. Yet, there remain many unanswered questions.
The first is: does the practice of SSA occur in the Netherlands? There is
little information available. According to the only national survey on the
issue, the majority of the Dutch population rejects SSA. The non-
representative data on cultural minorities suggest that certain cultural
minorities do have a cultural preference for sons, and that women are
condemned if they have not (yet) produced a boy. But it is unclear whether
they are prepared to accept SSA (Veldkamp Marktonderzoek, 1996).
Hence, Ramdas’s assumption that Muslims especially would be inclined to
practice SSA is not empirically founded. However, the background to the
Minister’s statement was that she was confronted with a testimony of an
abortion practitioner. This doctor said she had received requests for SSA
and had performed them (Lower Chamber, 1997). So, the practice clearly
does occur in the Netherlands. This gives rise to the next question: does
SSA constitute a moral wrong? In the eyes of the participants in the public
debate, the majority of the Dutch population and the Minister, it does.11
The question is why is it wrong?
In countries where SSA is a widespread phenomenon, such as India and
China, it is the expression of a cultural view in which women are of less
value than men (see Warren, 1985; Parikh, 1990; Arora, 1996). This
misogyny is why most people in the Netherlands condemned SSA as
morally wrong. Yet, as Mary Anne Warren rightly observes, ‘an action may
be morally questionable, and yet something which the agent has a moral
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right to do’ (Warren, 1987: 195). Didn’t feminists think that women have a
right to choose?
Although the Dutch abortion law does not reflect a straight pro-choice
position, let us for the sake of argument assume that it is pro-choice. Even
a policy that takes women’s right to choose as paramount does not
automatically mean SSA would be permissible. This is because in liberal
pro-choice justifications, the right to choose is never understood as an
unqualified right to do with one’s body as one pleases. It is usually assumed
that in the early stages the foetus is not a person and therefore has no moral
rights (to life and to equal treatment). However, in the later stages of
development, when the foetus becomes sentient, which is somewhere in the
second trimester, although not yet a constitutional person, it does have
moral standing (see Sumner, 1997). SSA can be performed in the second
trimester. It is therefore unclear whether the foetus should be considered
as possessing the capacity for sentience. If the foetus is not yet considered
a sentient being, then the only constitutional person present in this case
would be the woman. Therefore, her right of autonomy should take prece-
dence. If the foetus is considered to have acquired sentience, then an
abortion would need a strong justification. Could a cultural sex preference
possibly qualify as a compelling enough reason? In the case that the
Minister referred to in her challenged statement, there was mention of
threats; apparently the woman had reason to fear for her marriage or her
life. What may lay behind this? Let us turn to India.
In India, where SSA takes place on a large scale, it is in particular the
urban middle classes that take to the practice (see Retherford and Roy,
2003, UNFPA, 2003).12 An effect of India’s population control campaigns
is that a large family has become unfashionable among these classes. The
ideal family size is two children. SSA is a way to ensure that they have a
small family, yet at least one son (see Arora, 1996; Patel, 1996). A reason
for son preference is that daughters are considered an economic burden,
basically because they leave the family when they marry and must be
provided with an expensive dowry, while sons are expected to look after
their parents in old age (see Narayan, 1997). Next, in a family that already
has daughters, the birth of yet another daughter may decrease the prospects
of these daughters to make a good marriage, because the family lacks the
economic resources to provide their daughters with the dowry this requires,
and thus bring shame on the household (Patel, 1996). Women that decide
on an abortion are said to be responding to severe family pressure to
produce a son (see Parikh, 1990). Given this background, one is inclined to
agree with Warren when she states that ‘in a highly patriarchal society, sex
selection (. . .) may be an extremely compelling reason [for abortion] from
the viewpoint of the individuals who must make the decision’ (1985: 105).
In a similar vein, Gail Weiss argues that it is family interests and community
normative practices that make it appear to be a desirable and, for many, the
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only viable option (Weiss, 1995: 202, 213). SSA would then be allowed;
there would be a ‘critical situation’ as intended by the Dutch abortion law.
On the other hand, this perspective adds a particularly bitter edge to
Rosalind Petchesky’s remark that ‘the “right to choose” means very little
when women are powerless. (. . .) Women make their own reproductive
choices, but (. . .) they make them under social conditions and constraints
which they, as mere individuals, are powerless to change’ (Petchesky, 1980,
quoted in Katz Rothman, 1991: 174). We should be wary therefore, as Dolly
Arora warns, of techniques like SSA. What appears initially to increase
individual choice, can, in effect, become an instrument of male control over
the reproductive rights of women in patriarchal and authoritarian cultures
(see Arora, 1996: 421). As the technology that facilitates sex-selective
abortion does not lead to women’s increased freedom and well-being, the
appropriate response would then be to withhold access to it. SSA would
simply not be an option that required consideration. This is also suggested
by Warren, when she writes: ‘the more powerful the social pressures upon
women to have sons, the more room there is to doubt that they are really
free to choose or reject SSA, and, perhaps, the stronger the argument for
prohibition’ (1987: 195, 196).
TOLERANCE, AUTONOMY, AND OPPRESSION
Most proponents of multiculturalism do not advocate unconditional license
for a cultural group to live according to its own traditions. Tolerance is,
amongst other things, conditioned by the right to autonomy; individual
group members must be free to choose whether or not to follow tradition.
Discussing female circumcision, Bhikhu Parekh, for instance, argues that
we should not allow it to be practised on children (2000: 275–8). But when
it concerns adult female circumcision, we should make an exception, ‘when
the demand for it is genuinely voluntary and based on deeply held moral
beliefs’ (2000: 279). So, for multiculturalists, an important criterion for the
tolerance of a cultural practice is whether this practice is freely chosen.
It could be supposed that SSA is a medical intervention which women
would not request voluntarily. Ramdas argued this point (see above). But
this seems very much like saying that if a woman takes a decision that runs
counter to the majority culture’s sense of what is right and just, it cannot be
her decision. It must be imposed by an outside source – her husband, her
culture, her religion. As a result, we need not take her wishes seriously. In
contrast, we should take seriously the decisions of women who, for instance,
are pressured by poverty, as in Ramdas’ example of an unemployed woman
seeking an abortion. Ramdas’ argument assumes that western women are
fully autonomous in their decision-making, while women from non-western
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cultures, as victims of their culture, are not. We could counter-argue that all
of us are shaped by our cultures and furthermore that not all western
women are as fully autonomous as he assumes. And that his example of the
unemployed woman illustrates once again that we need social rights to turn
rights to freedom into substantive rights. However, this counter-argument
does not answer the question he raises about the moral agency of women
from non-western cultures.
In the case referred to by the Minister, the abortion practitioner had
established in the individual interview prescribed by the Dutch abortion
legislation that the woman concerned was genuinely convinced that she
wanted this abortion. Still, we may have serious doubts whether her
freedom to choose was not curtailed (as she apparently had to fear for her
marriage and even her life). From this I would not infer, however, as
Ramdas did, that she was but a brainwashed victim of her culture, who
therefore may be ignored as a moral person. There is, first, the social and
cultural context to consider. With Weiss, I would like to keep open the
possibility that women who decide to undergo a SSA do so in good faith,
because they think that by doing so they are saving their family from
devastating economic burden (cf. Weiss, 1995: 214).13 Second, women who
contemplate SSA, experience, most likely, great family pressure to comply.
This means, however, that their right of autonomy is curtailed, not their
mental capacity for autonomy.14
Yet, the question remains: what weight should we give to these consider-
ations? Obviously, the choice for a SSA is made under severe constraints.
Should this lead to an amendment of the abortion law in the Netherlands
so as to prevent SSA?
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES AND THE WEIGHT OF CONTEXT
SSA violates the principle of sexual equality; it denies female foetuses an
equal right to life. It therefore constitutes a moral wrong in the eyes of the
Dutch, including mine. Yet, from this does not follow that the abortion law
must be tightened. This is because the principle of sexual equality conflicts
in this case with the autonomy of women. Tightening the abortion law so
as to prevent SSA would require the formulation of general criteria for
what counts as a morally acceptable reason for an abortion, as well as
require the scrutinizing of all women’s reasons for choosing abortion. This
would amount to a major violation of the autonomy of all women that
request an abortion.
This seems an undesirable option. The rationale of current Dutch
practice is that it tries to prevent SSA not by restricting access to abortion,
but by restricting access to pre-natal diagnostic technology that determines
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the sex of the foetus. This does not fully exclude misuse of the abortion law
to obtain a SSA. So it only partially succeeds in upholding the principle of
sexual equality. It clearly does not give equal respect to cultures that do not
recognize the equality of men and women. However, it does acknowledge
that women have the right to control their own bodies. Given the likelihood
that in the Netherlands SSA hardly occurs, the current Dutch policy
practice seems to strike a reasonable balance between the different
competing principles.
In the Indian context, however, current Dutch rules and legislation on
PND and abortion would clearly be insufficient. As mentioned before, SSA
is widely practised in India, even to a point that, in some Indian states, the
male–female ratio is adverse (see UNFPA, 2003). We know that individual
women are pressured to have a SSA, while as compared to the Netherlands
their exit-options are limited, as there are hardly any institutional structures
that enable women to leave oppressive domestic relationships (see
Narayan, 1997). Given this situation, there is ample reason for stricter
legislation. In fact, India has sought to ban SSA – as, in the Netherlands,
not through tightening the abortion law, but through restricting access to
PND. PND may only be used for the purpose of detecting genetic
anomalies or other sex-linked disorders of the foetus. Private clinics have
to be registered and monitored. Moreover, the Indian legislature has
recently sharpened the PND Act through an amendment that came into
force from February 2003.15 In India, it is lack of public support for the law,
i.e. the strong cultural preference for sons, and in relation to that problems
with the enforcement of the law, that explains why SSA is still so widely
practised.
Hence, while we grudgingly tolerate in the Dutch context that some
women may misuse PND and the abortion law for obtaining a SSA, this
tolerance is impossible to uphold in the Indian context. One might well ask
if this is not a morally inconsistent position to hold. Why this does not
amount for contextualists to moral inconsistency is well explained by
Parekh. He argues:
We might feel that in the light of a society’s history, traditions of inequality of
power and cultural ethos, . . . practices [like voluntary adult female
circumcision, polygamy, sale of body parts or sati] are likely to be misused, fail
to realise their intended purpose, or lead to unacceptable long-term
consequences, and should be banned. Since consequences play an important
part in our assessment of a practice and since they are historically contingent,
we might ban it in one society, or at one time in its history, or under one set of
circumstances, but not another without incurring the charge of moral
inconsistency. (Parekh, 2000: 293–4)
In the Dutch context we can afford to live with rather lenient rules on PND,
while in the Indian context clearly stricter rules are required.
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CONCLUSION AND DEBATE
Trevor Phillips was right to note that Dutch tolerance of immigrant
minority cultures has declined in the past period. That is not to say that state
interference in the traditions of cultural minorities is never in place. Certain
minority practices do violate their female members’ rights and interference
might in some cases be warranted.
SSA is practised, albeit probably only on a very small scale, by
immigrant minorities in the Netherlands, probably not by Muslims.
Whether SSA is practised in other European countries, and on what scale,
we do not know, as it is not registered. We do know, however, that in other
western countries with minorities from countries where SSA is prevalent,
some of these immigrants desire SSA (for the USA see Weiss, 1996, for
Canada, see Minister of Government Services Canada, 1993). We may
expect therefore, as the legal rules on PND and abortion in most European
countries do not exclude SSA, that it does occur.
In the Dutch debate on SSA, a cultural preference for sons was
construed as an irrational preference, springing from a backward sexist
culture, and minority women got depicted as victims of that culture. Yet, a
contextual analysis of SSA leads to a dramatically different picture. My
excursion into the practice of SSA in India showed some of the intricacies
of culture, modernity and gender inequality. SSA is possible, first, because
of the existence of modern PND techniques, and practised not by the
poorest, most backward part of the population, but by the urban middle
class. Second, the dowry system plays an important role in the motives of
Indian women to choose a SSA. Yet dowries have become so expensive
because an increasingly market-dominated modern economy led to the
commercialization of the dowry system (Narayan, 1997: 110–11). If we take
into consideration the wider context in which Indian women choose a SSA,
their motives appear neither irrational nor immoral. SSA is morally wrong,
yet individuals that choose SSA are not necessarily morally inferior to those
who do not (have to) make that choice.
When I argued that it is not desirable to restrict access to abortion in the
Netherlands, this is not because I think that requests for a SSA spring from
a harmless cultural tradition. SSA, by not granting female foetuses an equal
right to life, constitutes in my view a moral wrong. Yet, the moral dilemma
for the legislature is that amending the abortion law, so as to make SSA
impossible, would inevitably amount to a serious infringement of the
autonomy of all women that ask for an abortion.
I argued that preventing SSA by restricting access to abortion is there-
fore an undesirable option and that the legislature in the Netherlands, as in
India, was correct to seek to ban SSA not by restricting access to abortion,
but to PND. The difference is that Dutch rules on PND are rather more
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lenient than those in India. Again, I think this is justified, because in the
Dutch situation, SSA in all likelihood hardly occurs, while in India it is
practised on a large scale. One might ask if we should condone in the
Netherlands what we try to fight with all our power in India. I argued that
we may – as in a contextual approach, non-moral considerations may co-
determine our moral judgement.
While the current Dutch rules and legislation on PND and abortion do
not require any change, this is not to say that all is peaches and cream in
minority cultures in the Netherlands. We know no more about the woman
that the Dutch Minister referred to in her statement than that she had to
fear for her marriage or even her life if she did not consent to a SSA.
Neither do we know why the abortion practitioner that interviewed her still
considered her choice to be a free choice. We do know, however, that a
decision to undergo a SSA is usually taken under severe social constraints
and that the roots of the problem lie, as the women’s organizations in the
Netherlands correctly pointed out, in the patriarchal cultural traditions that
make daughters the undesired sex. PND legislation does not tackle this
cause. Similarly, the PND Act in India is ineffective because it lacks public
support; people seek ways to circumvent it. Of equal importance therefore
is public social policy aimed at tackling the causes of son preference, like
the dowry system, against which the Indian government has campaigned
(Narayan, 1997). It is encouraging therefore that son preference is declin-
ing in almost all Indian states (Retherford and Roy, 2003: 4), as it suggests
that these policy measures do have an effect. To come back to the woman
in the Dutch case: we do not know about her circumstances, but it is easy
to imagine that an isolated immigrant woman is not in a situation to make
full use of her right of autonomy. Obviously, more is needed than merely
the prescribed interview to ensure that her choice is freely made. To
enhance her autonomy against her family’s pressure, her isolation should
be lifted, so that she is informed about her rights. These should minimally
include a secure residence status, so that she knows that, in case of a
divorce, she is allowed to stay, and retain custody rights over her other
children.
Lastly, let me come back to the relation between feminism and multi-
culturalism. SSA is a case in which autonomy and gender equality conflict
and one in which respect for cultural diversity conflicts with gender
equality. If we put the autonomy of women first, then we should also accept
a woman’s possible culturally inspired desire for a SSA. Respect for cultural
diversity is thus linked to autonomy. As autonomy and equality are both
principles feminists endorse, contrary to my initial intuition, it is rather
difficult to perceive of this case as one in which feminism and multicultural-
ism conflict. The general message this case holds for me is that feminism
cannot be an a priori moral position that tells us what is right and what is
wrong. In each case, reaching a coherent feminist position requires hard
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work. The claim that feminism and multiculturalism conflict is wrong simply
because it is too general. So, yes, we need moral arguments, but no, we can
do without fixed moral positions.
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Notes
1 He must be misinformed here, because to my knowledge there was never any
policy intention to combat arranged marriages. But there is policy, which is now
being implemented, to discourage marriages with a spouse from the (non-EU)
country of origin.
2 As far as the schools are concerned this is a rather complex claim, because there
are several public/private distinctions to consider. In the case of denomina-
tional, i.e. non-public, schools, their right to maintain their religious identity is
understood to include the right to forbid the headscarf. Public schools do not
have that right. There was, at the time of Phillips’ visit, discussion about the
niqaab, a form of veiling that covers the face. The Minister of Education issued
a guideline that allows educational institutions, public and private, to forbid the
wearing of the niqaab. The main reason for schools to forbid the niqaab is that
the bearer excludes herself from the school community because she no longer
has a public identity (Duursma, 2003).
3 Pim Fortuyn was the leader of a political party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF),
who considered Islam ‘a backward culture’, who opined that the first article of
the Dutch constitution, i.e. the anti-discrimination article, should be removed
and who was assassinated, in May 2002, by an animal welfare activist. After
his death, the LPF overwhelmingly won national elections with an anti-
immigration program. Although the decline of the LPF then set in quickly, its
initial rise is considered by many in the Netherlands as an expression of the
dissatisfaction of the public with Dutch politics, with Dutch immigration and
Dutch minority politics in particular. The minority policy was perceived as
being too soft, minorities would be ‘pampered’ and it was suggested that under
the banner of respect for cultural diversity tolerance had gone too far. At this
moment a parliamentary investigation has been completed about the failing of
Dutch minorities policy.
4 Yet this appears to be a gradual process, which is not necessarily occasioned by
recent events. The polls cover a period from 1991 to 2002. It is still too early to
measure a ‘Fortuyn’ effect, but there is no sudden dip in the attitude of the
Dutch towards minorities between 2000 and 2002. Hence, there is no visible
‘September 11 2001’ effect.
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5 See, for a more extensive account, the mentioned literature and also Saharso
and Bader, 2004.
6 SSAs are usually performed in the second trimester of pregnancy because pre-
natal diagnosis cannot be conducted earlier. See for technical information
Saharso, 1999.
7 Other PND techniques are the triple test and the measuring of the cervical
crease. The first is a blood test, while the second is done through ultrasound.
Their aim is to detect serious genetic diseases or congenital anomalies. As the
predictive value of these tests is between 60 and 80 percent, the standard
procedure is, when the test results point to the presence of an anomaly, to
further determine this through chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis.
Therefore I shall not further consider the triple test and the measuring of the
cervical crease.
8 It is currently being discussed in the Netherlands whether the rules for
commercial clinics that offer ultrasound, triple tests and measuring of the
cervical crease should be tightened. This is inspired not by the wish to make it
impossible to detect the foetus’s sex, but to prevent these clinics from referring
pregnant women wrongfully (based on a false-positive test result) for further
PND in a hospital. This not only leads to unnecessary expenditures on public
health, but also to unnecessary miscarriages, as amniocentesis and chorionic
villus sampling do carry a certain risk (Peeperkorn and de Visser, 2003).
9 Note, however, that the Dutch abortion law does not reflect a straightforward
pro-choice position. The law is a hard-won compromise between the liberals
and social democrats, who endorsed a pro-choice position, and the Christian
democrats, who endorsed a pro-life position. According to the law, it is the
woman who decides, but at the same time the procedures of the law (the
requirement of a justification in terms of the woman’s life or health, the five-
day waiting period that the woman is obliged to observe) recognize the view
that at every stage of development the foetus does have a moral status that
should be weighed alongside (but not necessarily outweigh) the woman’s
interest in controlling her own body. For a full historical account of the Dutch
abortion law, see Outshoorn 1986.
10 I have examined the reactions in three national daily newspapers that, when
taken together, offer a reasonable picture of the political spectrum in the
Netherlands: Trouw (Christian), De Volkskrant (social democratic) and NRC
Handelsblad (liberal). In addition, I consulted reactions in Contrast, a weekly
magazine on multicultural society; an open letter dated 20 January 1997 sent to
the Minister by the Vrouwenberaad Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Women’s
Council on Development Aid), AISA, TARGUIA and TIYE International,
which together form the most important national organizations of and for black,
migrant and refugee women; lastly, the reaction of the Pro Life (Consultative)
Platform (PLOP), contained in a letter dated 29 August 1997 sent to the
Permanent Parliamentary Commission on Health in connection with the
investigation commissioned by the Minister on whether there is any need to
tighten up the law on abortion (PLOP, 1997). The majority of anti-abortion
groups are represented in PLOP.
11 Minister Borst again made it clear that she considers the use of pre-natal
technology for sex selection on non-medical grounds as an undesirable
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development through her decision, taken in June 1998, to close down the gender
clinic that offered sperm treatment with assisted insemination – which is yet
another way to influence the sex of the foetus (De Volkskrant, 1998).
12 It is estimated that over a million SSA’s were performed in India during the
period 1981–91. One should realize, however, that, as Das Gupta and Mari Bhat
(1998: 90) remind us, statistically this figure is not very large – it represents less
than 1 percent of female births in that decade. Still, we should not feel reassured
by this, as it means that, as again Das Gupta and Mari Bhat (1998) point out,
‘excess female child mortality after birth continues to be the dominant practice
in removing female children in India’.
13 Weiss herself therefore prefers to see SSA as a ‘moral mistake’, so as to
acknowledge that individuals who have chosen SSA are not acting in an
irresponsible manner, but ‘are making their decision in the light of moral
considerations regarding how best to secure the material interests of their
families’ (Weiss, 1995: 214).
14 This distinction between the right to, and the capacity for, autonomy is further
elaborated in Saharso (2000).
15 Under the new Act, a person who seeks help for sex selection risks imprison-
ment for a three-year period and can be required to pay a fine of Rs. 50.000.
The medical practitioner involved risks the State Medical Council removing his
or her name from the Council’s register (see UNFPA, 2003).
References
Arora, D. (1996) ‘The Victimising Discourse: Sex-Determination Technologies and
Policy’, Economic and Political Weekly 17 February: 420–4.
Bagley, C. (1973) The Dutch Society: A Comparative Study in Race Relations.
Oxford/London: Oxford University Press.
Benhabib, S. (2002) The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era.
Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Carens, J.H. (2000) Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration
of Justice as Evenhandedness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dagevos, J., M. Gijsberts and C. van Praag, eds (2003) SCP Rapportage Minderhe-
den 2003. Onderwijs, arbeid en sociaal-culturele integratie (SCP Report Minori-
ties 2003. Education, work and social cultural integration). Den Haag: SCP.
Das Gupta, M. and P.N. Mari Bhat (1998) ‘Intensified Gender Bias in India: A
Consequence of Fertility Decline’, in M. Krishnaraj, R.M. Sudarshan, A. Shariff
(eds) Gender, Population and Development, pp. 73–93. Delhi: Oxford University
Press.
De Boer, M.G. (1997) De WAZ in de praktijk: een onderzoek naar de naleving van
de Wet afbreking zwangerschap. Onderzoek op verzoek van de Minister van
Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Sport (The law on the breaking off of pregnancies
in practice: An investigation into the observance of the Law on the Breaking Off
of Pregnancies. Investigation at request of the Minister of Public Health, Welfare
and Sport). Rijswijk: Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (Inspection for Public
Health).
De Volkskrant (1997a) ‘Artsen zouden abortuswet overtreden’ (Medical prac-
titioners would break the abortion law), 17 January: 13.
DEBATE
De Volkskrant (1997b) ‘Borst handhaaft uitspraak abortus’ (Borst keeps to
statement about abortion), 22 January: 3.
De Volkskrant (1997c) ‘Minister Borst houdt uitspraken over abortus om geslacht
overeind’ (Minister Borst upholds statements about SSA), 22 January: 8.
De Volkskrant (1998) ‘Kliniek voor geslachtskeuze moet per 1 oktober sluiten’
(Clinic for sex choice must close down by 1 October), 20 June: 21.
De Waard, P. (2003) ‘Britse adviseur schrikt van intolerantie in Nederland’, (British
advisor shocked by intolerance in the Netherlands), De Volkskrant 2 July: 4.
Duursma, M. (2003) De jacht op codes; het problematische verbod op Lonsdale en
andere ‘extreem rechtse’ merken (The hunt for codes; the problematic ban on
Lonsdale and other ultra-right brands), NRC Handelsblad, 27 September: 29.
Hiu, P. (2003) ‘Babysterfte vergt meer onderzoek’ (Baby mortality requires more
research), De Volkskrant 4 December: 2.
Katz Rothman, B. (1991) ‘Prenatal Diagnosis’, in J.M. Humber and R.F. Almeder
(eds) Biomedal Ethics Reviews 1991. Bioethics and the Fetus: Medical, Moral and
Legal Issues, pp. 171–86. Totowa, NY: Humana Press.
Koper, A. (1997) ‘Flinterdunne opwinding’ (Paperthin excitement), De Volkskrant
25 January.
Kymlicka, W. (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lower Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament (1997) Vragenuur (Question hour),
21 January, TK 42–33.
Minister of Government Services Canada (1993) Proceed with Care: Final Report
of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Vol. 2 Ottawa:
Minister of Government Services Canada.
Narayan, U. (1997) Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World
Feminism. New York/London: Routledge.
Okin, S. Moller (1999) ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’, in J. Cohen, M.
Howard and M.C. Nussbaum (eds) Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Susan
Moller Okin with Respondents, pp. 9–24. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Outshoorn, J. (1986) ‘The Feminist Movement and Abortion Policy in the Nether-
lands’, in D. Dahlerup (ed.) The New Women’s Movement: Feminism and
Political Power in Europe and the United State, pp. 64–85. Beverley Hills/London:
Sage.
Outshoorn, J. (1996) ‘The Stability of Compromise: Abortion Politics in Western
Europe’, in M. Githens and D. McBride Stetson (eds) Abortion Politics: Public
Policy in Cross-cultural Perspective, pp. 145–64. London: Routledge.
Parekh, B. (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political
Theory. Houndmills/London: Macmillan.
Parikh, M. (1990) ‘Sex-Selective Abortions in India: Parental Choice or Sexist
Discrimination?’, Feminist Issues 10(2): 19–32.
Patel, R. (1996) The Practice of Sex Selective Abortion in India: May You Be the
Mother of a Hundred Sons. UCIS paper no. 7 [http://www.ucis.unc.edu/about/
pubs/carolina/abortion.pdf].
Peeperkorn, M. and E. de Visser (2003) ‘Pret-echo van foetus aan banden’ (Fun-
ultrasound limited), De Volkskrant 22 November: 1.
ETHNICITIES 5(2)264
265
Petchesky, R. (1980) ‘Reproductive Freedom: Beyond a Woman’s Right to Choose’,
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 5: 661–85
PLOP (Pro Life Overleg (Consultation) Platform) (1997) ‘Brief aan de voorzitter
en de leden van de Vaste Kamercommissie voor Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en
Sport betreffende de Wet Afbreking Zwangerschap’ (Letter to the president and
the members of the permanent parliamentary commission for Public Health,
Welfare and Sport), Amersfoort, 29 August.
Ramdas, A. (1997) ‘Borst laat islamitische vrouwen in de steek’ (Borst lets down
Islamic women), NRC Handelsblad 25 January: 7.
Retherford, R.D. and T.K. Roy (2003) Factors Affecting Sex-Selective Abortion in
India and 17 Major States, National Family Health Survey Subject Reports No.
21. Mumbai: International Institute for Population Sciences/Honolulu Hawaii;
USA: East–West Center Program on Population.
Saharso, S. (1999) ‘Women’s Right of Choice?! A Reflection on Women’s Rights,
Cultural Toleration and Public Morality’, Acta Politica 34(4): 331–50.
Saharso, S. (2000) ‘Female Autonomy and Cultural Imperative: Two Hearts Beating
Together’, in W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse Societies,
pp. 224–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Saharso, S. and V.M. Bader, eds (2004) ‘Contextual Morality and Ethno-religious
Diversity’ special issue, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7(2).
Sumner, L.W. (1997) ‘Abortion: A Moderate View’, in James E. White (ed.)
Contemporary Moral Problems (5th edition), pp. 158–69. St Paul, MN: West
Publishing Company.
Trouw (1997) ‘Abortusarts: Een foetus, hoe klein ook, heeft waarde’ (Abortion
medical practitioner: A foetus, however small, has value), 25 January.
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) Office of the Registrar General and
Census Commissioner, India, Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
(2003) Missing . . . Mapping the Adverse Child Sex Ratio in India. [http:
//www.unpfa.org.news].
Veldkamp Marktonderzoek (Veldkamp Market Research) (1996) Geslachtskeuze
om niet-medische redenen: De mening van de Nederlandse bevolking. (Sexchoice
for non-medical reasons: The opinion of the Dutch population). Den Haag:
Rathenau Institute and the Platform Wetenschap en Ethiek (Platform Science
and Ethics).
Vrouwenberaad Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Women’s Council on Development
Aid), AISA, TARGUIA and TIYE International (1997) Open Brief aan Minister
Borst (Open Letter to Minister Borst), Oegstgeest, 20 January.
Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality. New
York: Basic Books.
Warren, M.A. (1985) Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection. Totowa, NY:
Rowman and Allanheld.
Warren, M.A. (1987) ‘A Reply to Holmes on Gendercide’, Bioethics 1(2): 189–98.
Weiss, G. (1995) ‘Sex Selective Abortion: A Relational Approach’, Hypatia 10(1):
202–17.
Williams, M. (2000) ‘Toleration Canadian Style: Reflections of a Yankee Canadian’,
in R. Beiner and W. Norman (eds) Canadian Political Philosophy. New York/
Oxford: Oxford University press.
DEBATE
SAWITRI SAHARSO is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Social
Cultural Sciences of the Free University Amsterdam. Address: Department
of Social Cultural Sciences, Free University, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email: S.Saharso@fsw.vu.nl]
Culture or inequality in sex-selective
abortion?
A response to Sawitri Saharso
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Sawitri Saharso’s article on sex-selective abortion amongst minority popu-
lations in the Netherlands comes at an important moment: immigration and
the issue of integration of immigrant and minority populations occupy a
central place in both public discourse and policy-making European-wide.
Indeed, the issues of immigration and integration have played a significant
role in election outcomes across Europe. Saharso goes to the heart of the
matter in addressing the role of women and gender, which occupies a
pivotal place in the debate over immigration. Not unlike the colonial era,
when the perceived oppression of women in colonized regions was used as
a benchmark of the barbarity of that culture in contrast to the modernity
of the West, today, a similar process is occurring in the post-colonies. As
Saharso points out, a concern with gender inequality often functions as a
proxy for anti-immigrant and or anti-Muslim discourses and practices. She
argues convincingly that feminism requires a contextual approach, one that
allows no easy a priori moral positions. This approach leads her to suggest
that access to abortion as well as pre-natal diagnostic techniques should be
available equally to all women in the Netherlands, wherever they come
from, and whatever they believe, and whether or not some choose to use it
to abort female fetuses in favour of males. This call for equal access, she
suggests, is largely because in the Netherlands, sex selective abortion has
not been proven to be a common practice; hence women’s right to
autonomy trumps the risk of undermining sexual equality.
I generally agree with Saharso’s conclusions, and, in particular, I agree
with her suggestion to enhance immigrant women’s ability to make choices
by securing their residency status, and informing them of their rights, rather
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